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Abstract: Forest certification has been introduced by non-state actors as a voluntary and market-based 
instrument addressing forest problems, which state policies failed to resolve. Lately, however, state-driven 
forest-related certification schemes can be observed, e.g. in Indonesia, through the EU FLEGT-VPA 
negotiation process. It is argued, specific state agencies in a struggle for power and authority develop 
mandatory certification schemes which are directly competing with private ones. Before this background, 
the aims of this study are: (i) describing the current trend from voluntary private to mandatory state 
certification schemes in Indonesia, (ii) mapping the main actors involved in certification politics, and (iii) 
explaining this trend with the interests of the main actors. The results confirm a trend from voluntary 
private to mandatory state-driven certification of forest management. The Ministry of Forestry, the 
Ministry of Trade, the Ministry of Industry, wood producer and processing associations, European Union, 
local funding organizations, environmental organizations, certification bodies and international buyers are 
detected as the main coalitions and actors in the certification politics. The stronger coalition develops a 
mandatorily-timber legality verification system as strategies to counter their voluntary private competitor 
schemes.  
Keywords: competition; forest certification; international governance; private governance; state 
governance; bureaucratic politics; forest policy  
 
1. Introduction 
As a response to the failed negotiations among governments on a global forest convention in 
1992, forest certification has subsequently been introduced by non-governmental actor coalitions 
for promoting sustainable forest management (Boström, 2003; McDermott, 2014). There are two 
ideas underlying the emergence of the non-state-actor driven certification schemes, such as the 
Forest Steward Council (FSC). First, it was an effort by environmental non-governmental 
organizations to voluntarily certify responsible-managed forest in Europe and North America 
(Bartley, 2007). Second, such non-state, market-driven, and voluntary forest certification schemes 
also aimed to certify tropical and mega-diversity forests including problems such as vast 
deforestation, degradation and illegal logging (Gulbrandsen, 2004; Blackman et al., 2014). 
Shortly after the FSC was launched in 1993, other voluntary, non-state certification schemes 
that were better known locally and that had more support from industry groups were founded 
during the 1990s to better accommodate local forestry practices. These included e.g. the 
Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI) and the American Tree Farm System (ATFS) in North America, 
the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC, initially the Pan-European 
Forest Certification) in Europe, the Sustainable Forest Management System in Canada, and 
Lembaga Ekolabel Indonesia (LEI) in Indonesia (Tosun, 2012; Maryudi 2006, 2009). All these forest 
certification initiatives have been largely driven by non-state, private actors and voluntary 
subscription and are consequently regarded as private institutions (Pattberg, 2007). They, yet, 
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mirror an underlying competition between public and private actors over the authority to regulate 
forest management practices (Sikor, 2013). 
However, the success of private certification schemes in tackling specific forestry problems 
like illegal logging, forest encroachment and deforestation, and in improving forest governance in 
developing countries thus far has been limited (Durst et al., 2006; Tacconi, 2007; Espach, 2006). As 
a consequence, a state-driven, inter-governmental cooperation between timber producer and 
consumer countries was initiated by the European Union (EU) in 2003, known as Forest Law 
Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT), aiming to certify the legality of harvested timber 
(Wiersum and Elands, 2013). Such state-based forest certification initiatives now counter-compete 
with private ones and are assumed having the potential to dominate and even replace private 
certification schemes (Nurrochmat et al., 2014; Malets, 2015). 
Recent empirical findings support this latter perspective and suggest even a crucial role for 
state agencies in forest certification and related politics (Gale and Haward, 2011; Gulbrandsen, 
2014; Sahide et al., 2015). According to these literatures state agencies can obstruct (Gale and 
Haward, 2011) or support certification initiatives (Hysing, 2009; Bell and Hindmoor, 2012). More 
importantly, however, specific state bureaucracies, due to their formal mandate and ability to 
develop binding regulatory policy instruments, may even develop own certification schemes, as 
currently observed under the FLEGT process and regarding timber legality verification in Indonesia 
(Nurrochmat et al., 2014). In so doing, it is argued, state agencies develop mandatory certification 
schemes which are directly competing with private ones, mainly with foreign initiatives, and by 
this reclaim authority over forest certification through legitimized public actors (Giessen et al., 
2016). Before this background, the aims of this study are (i) describing the current trend from 
voluntary private to mandatory state certification schemes in Indonesia, (ii) mapping the main 
actors involved in certification politics, and (iii) explaining this trend with the interests of the main 
actors. 
2. Conceptual framework 
2.1. Voluntary forest private certification 
The FSC and PEFC forest certification systems have grown significantly and have become the 
largest in world, with a share of about 98% of all certified forest and chain of custody (CoC) 
certificates (FSC and PEFC, 2013). This amounts to 417 million hectares, or 10.3% of global forests 
area and a share of about 28% of the total round wood production (UNECE/FAO, 2013). This 
approach has successfully built a new mechanism in timber product trade by requiring all traded 
goods to meet a balance of ecological, social and economic requirements. By creating its own rules 
and simultaneously increasing public awareness of certified products, forest certification initiative 
governs the interaction between actors in forest product trade, and replaces the role of 
governments which failed to sign a global convention on forestry at the Earth Summit in 1992 
(Bernstein and Cashore, 1999; van Kooten et al., 2005). This private forest certification has 
transformed into real governance (Pattberg, 2007). Depending on their viewpoints in specific 
studies, forest policy analysts refer to this phenomenon using various terms, like non-state global 
governance (Bernstein, 2011), non-state market driven (NSMD) governance (Cashore, 2002; 
Cashore et al., 2007; Burns et al., 2016), non-state authority (Cashore et al., 2005), transnational 
(business) governance (Bartley, 2010), private forest governance (Pattberg, 2005), global forest 
governance (Gan et al., 2013), and global private meta-governance (Derkx and Glasbergen, 2014). 
2.2. Mandatory state certification 
At the 1998 G8 foreign ministers meeting, there was an agreement to cooperate with timber-
producing countries in the development of their own measures to counter illegal logging and 
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trading in illegally harvested timber (G8 Action Programme on Forests, 2002). Following this 
agreement, in 2003 the European Union (EU) declared the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance 
and Trade (FLEGT) action plan, which enabled producers from partner countries that had already 
signed FLEGT-voluntary partnership agreements (VPAs) to sell freely their legal products in EU 
territory (Brack, 2005, 2012). The agreement gave authority to partner countries to define “illegal 
timber” based on their own regulations, so that it acknowledged partner countries’ sovereignty 
over their forests. To date, six countries, including Indonesia, have signed FLEGT-VPA, while nine 
others are in negotiations (EU FLEGT Facility, 2014). The FLEGT-VPA is seen as a more equitable 
type of cooperation, since it binds both producers and consumers to sell and to buy only legally 
harvested timber. In addition, the direct participation of consumer countries in the penalization of 
the sale of illegal wood-based products in their territory, as promised by the US through the Lacey 
Act (2008) and by European Parliament through EU Timber Regulation (2010), is expected to 
diminish the space for illegal timber trade (Bartley, 2014). This is what cannot be addressed by 
voluntary forest certification initiatives such as FSC, PEFC, ISO 14000 or other more domestic 
initiatives (Solutions, 2003).  
The history of Indonesia-EU VPA started in 2007 while Indonesia saw that EU FLEGT could be 
the trigger for improving its national forest governance as well as to get international legitimacy 
on Indonesia wood products. A series negotiation had been done until 2011, and both parties 
agreed to implement VPA commitment in 2014. Two years later EU confirmed that Indonesia had 
fulfilled all requirements of VPA, and therefore entitle for unrestricted export into EU.  Along with 
the negotiation, government of Indonesia has been mandating all forest logging companies and 
timber manufacturers to be certified under SVLK, a national timber legality assurance agreed upon 
in FLEGT-VPA. 
2.3. Bureaucratic politics and the power of actors 
We use bureaucratic politics theory in order to cover more broadly those actors that may be 
influencing policies related to forest certification at the national level. Bureaucracies are defined 
as “agencies that have been created by governments or other public actors with some degree or 
permanence and coherence and beyond formal direct control of single nation governments and 
that act in the international arena to pursue a policy” (Bauer e t al., 2012:28). Bureaucracies are 
different from organizations, which are institutional arrangements built upon normative 
frameworks, members, and bureaucracies as administrative core institutions. They are also 
different from institutions, which are merely sets of principles and norms (Bauer et al., 2012). 
Studies on bureaucracies’ behavior (e.g. Krott, 1990; Peters, 2002, Giessen & Krott 2009, Giessen 
et al. 2014) reveal that although bureaucracies have a formal mandate to serve public interests, 
they will informally prioritize their own interests and compete with other bureaucracies for more 
resources, political domain and influence. To develop and direct specific policies, bureaucracies 
are equipped with power, which is defined as the ability to shape a programme according to own 
interests, even against resistance from other actors (Krott et al., 2014). According to Krott et al. 
(2014), power consists of three elements, namely (i) coercion, associated mostly with the ability to 
force an outcome, (ii) (dis-)incentives, the ability to offer (dis-)advantages to subordinate actors, 
and (iii) dominant information, selected information that is difficult or impossible to verify by 
another party. These power elements may be acquired through sanction mechanisms, transfer 
funds, and the expertise of bureaucracies. 
Given the rise of mandatory state forest certification systems and the obstructions faced by 
voluntary private systems, state bureaucracies now have the following options: (i) increasing their 
power vis-à-vis other bureaucracies by developing own certification schemes, and (ii) reclaiming 
authority from private certification schemes to regulate forest management. Before this 
theoretical background this article will scrutinize these propositions using the following methods. 
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3. Methods 
We employed document analysis, interviews, and observations to acquire solid data to meet 
our objectives. First, trends in the numbers of certified forest areas and certified companies under 
private (FSC and LEI) and state (Ministry of Forestry) certification schemes were drawn from the 
website of those bodies and were placed in charts to gain an overview of each initiative’s progress 
and to make comparisons possible. Any information from professional journals or professional 
mailing lists, and position papers from international organizations and associations were also 
considered to be valuable sources. 
Second, semi-structured interviews (Halperin and Heath, 2012) to identify the main actors 
within this issue and their positions were conducted in Jakarta and Bogor, Indonesia, during 
August 2013-February 2014, and were followed by online interviews until April 2014. The 
interviewees were staff from the Ministry of Forestry (MoF), the Ministry of Trade (MoT), and the 
Indonesian Woodworking Association (ISWA), the Forest Concessionaires Association (Asosiasi 
Pengusaha Hutan Indonesia or APHI), the Multistakeholder Forestry Programme (MFP), FSC 
Indonesia, certification auditors, and environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs). We 
were also involved as observers in the respective meetings during that period to listen to each 
actor's ideas and to find out what expectations the actors had from others. 
We treat sustainability certification and legality verification in same wave since both are quite 
similar in term of cost incurred and the process to go through. Some researchers (eg. Mcdermott 
et al., 2015; Brack, 2014) also reckon them are the same. 
Actors’ positions and their prospective coalitions were raised from theory of interest in 
environmental politics study. In analyzing actors’ positions we assumed that every actor behaved 
rationally, meaning that actors tried to maximize their own benefit rather than to promote a 
general goal, like maintaining environmental sustainability and equality. To contest norm- and 
interest-driven is acceptable (see: Van Schaik and Schunz, 2012; Gulbrandsen, 2003) since each 
actor (which can be an individual, organization or state) has its own interest, adding to their effort 
to meet common desire. We follow expert judgment (Wibowo and Giessen, 2015) and our 
experiences in the field to rise up main issues and discussing them based rational behavior of 
actors.  
4. Results 
4.1. Voluntary private and mandatory state certifications in figures 
Until 2014 there have been three forest certification schemes in Indonesia, namely the LEI 
and FSC, both of which are voluntary-private initiatives, and the PHPL (Pengelolaan Hutan 
Produksi/ mandatory state scheme). Forest certification assignment under the FSC was first 
conducted in 1998 and successfully certified three out of five assessed FMUs in Java, which was 
then followed by seven others within the next two years. However, all of these certificates were 
suspended and withdrawn in 2003 due to unsatisfactory management improvement and non-
compliance with FSC standards (Muhtaman and Prasetyo, 2006). A new era of FSC standards-
based certification was introduced in 2008, when six FMUs, with a total managed area of 707,709 
ha, obtained sustainable certificates (FSC, 2008). This grew to 1,089,942 ha in 2009, then dropped 
to 638,455 ha in 2011, and peaked again at 2,002,710 ha in November 2014, representing the 
certified area of 29 FMUs (FSC, 2009, 2011, 2014).  
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Source: FSC (various years), LEI (various years) and MoF (various years). 
Figure 1. Size of certified forest area under FSC, LEI and SVLK schemes in the period 2006-2014 
 
Similarly, the first certification process using LEI standard was also conducted in 1998, and 
putting PT Diamond Raya Timber who managed 90,956 ha of natural production forest as the first 
cooperation obtained the certificate a year later (Muhtaman and Prasetyo, 2006). Since then, 
there has been no serial data available to the public until the LEI released FMU and manufacture 
LEI certified document (LEI, 2013), which mentioned that there were 1,873,428 ha of certified-
forests, consisting of 411,690 ha of natural production forests (22%) from two FMUs, 1,429,055 ha 
of plantation forests (76%) managed by 15 FMUs, and 32,683 ha of community forests (2%) from 
22 community groups. Furthermore, the LEI (2014) informed that the certified natural forest area 
had dropped about 80% within the period 2009-2014, and that the plantation forest area had 
increased 400% during that time. 
Unlike the two previous voluntary schemes, PHPL is a mandatory state scheme enacted by the 
government in 2012, and effectively applied to all forest concessionaires and FMUs in 2013. The 
PHPL (SVLK)-certified forest area until May 2014 was 2,542,091 ha, representing an area managed 
by 40 FMUs (calculated from MoF, 2014). The certified forest area under the PHPL scheme was 
higher than those under FSC and LEI, even though the PHPL started in 2013 (Figure 1). It is likely 
that FSC- or LEI-certified FMUs are also certified under SVLK, since the processes to obtain such 
certificates are quite similar, and same certification body may carry out the late assessment. 
Consequently, the total certified forest area under the three schemes cannot represent the total 
sustainably managed forest area in Indonesia. 
In respect of the chain of custody (CoC) certification, there were six companies which held LEI 
certificates in 2009, and one of them did not reengage with the LEI in the second round (LEI, 2014). 
Conversely, the number of FSC CoC certificates doubled, from 87 in 2009 to 175 in 2012, and 
reached 193 by November 2014 (FSC, various years). A significant number of SLKs (sertifikat 
legalitas kayu or timber legality certificate; a form of certificate under the SVLK) were also issued 
by certification bodies, as the government started to force all exporters to provide V-legal 
documents for their wood products. By 2013, this number reached 726 companies (MoF, 2013) or 
almost four times the FSC holders, and grew continuously to 894 firms in 2014 (Table 1) 
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Table 1. Number of companies holding FSC, LEI and SVLK certificates 
Year Number of certified companies under each scheme 
FSC LEI SVLK 
2009 87 6 - 
2010 136 6 - 
2011 161 6 - 
2012 175 6 - 
2013 188 6 726 
2014 193 5 894 
Source: FSC (various years), LEI (2013, 2014), MoF (2014). 
4.2. Costs of sustainable forest certification and legality verification 
The cost of forest certification and timber legality verification vary, depending on the size of 
forest area, investment capital, and production capacity of the company. This cost applied at first 
assessment to gain the certificate and at yearly surveillance within certificate’s validity period. 
Cost component charged by certification body to the company including fee for auditors, data and 
information collection, field assessment, reporting fee, documentation, and security assistance for 
auditors if needed. For SVLK scheme the Minister of (Environment and) Forestry released the 
Ministry Regulation P.13/2013, which amended by P.96/2014, on the standard cost for sustainable 
forest management assessment and timber legality verification. It is mentioned that the total cost 
for legality assessment for small and medium scale-wood processing industry could reach 6.6 
million IDR, and up to 28.8 and 170 million IDR for bigger industry and large forest management 
units, respectively. In the meantime, the cost for forest sustainability assessment is around 222-
280 million IDR and up to 132 million IDR for its yearly surveillance. All these costs are excluding 
travelling cost for auditors from Jakarta to the field. From private certification side, there is no 
official data on the cost of assessment and surveillance processes available for public. Pratiwi et al. 
(2015) reported that the costs paid by the companies for gaining FSC, LEI and PHPL-SVLK 
certificates are at least 31, 60, and 75 million IDR, respectively, depending on the scale of 
company. 
4.3. Mapping main actors and their interests 
Actors involved in forest certification in Indonesia are found along the production-
consumption chain, starting with the actors initiating certification schemes and ending with buyers 
in consumer countries. The following are three groups of influential actors and their roles in 
shaping recent construction based on their tendencies and interests. 
4.3.1. The coalition on state certification 
• The Ministry of Forestry 
The Ministry of Forestry (MoF) was the main state agency responsible for establishing the 
national timber legality assurance system called SVLK. The SVLK installation process began in 2003, 
when the MoF organized some civil social organizations, i.e., Telapak, Environmental Investigation 
Agency, Indonesian Ecolabel Institute, and the Nature Conservancy to hold a series cross sectoral 
dialog in developing SVLK (MFP, 2014). SVLK, which enacted through the Minister of Forestry 
Regulation No P.38/2009, and up to December 2014 was already five times amended (MoF, 2011; 
2012; 2013; 2014a; MoEF, 2014a), has become the core of Indonesia-EU FLEGT-VPA negotiation. 
The MoF tried to apply the SVLK comprehensively to all forest industry and timber manufacturers 
immediately, in order to maintain the credibility of the SVLK and the MoF. However, due to 
external pressure, the MoF (which was transformed into the Ministry of Environment and Forestry 
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or MoEF in October 2014) extended the deadline for obtaining the certificates and simplified some 
provisions in the SVLK so that small and medium-sized enterprises could join it (see MoF, 2014b; 
MoEF, 2014b). 
• The Ministry of Trade 
The Ministry of Trade (MoT) has the mission of increasing the added value and volume of 
exported goods by setting up regulations to support progressive export activities. Regarding wood 
legality, the MoT issued a regulation on the export of forestry industrial products, whereby one 
group of export timber products had to have V-Legal documents in 2013, and another group had 
to have these in 2014 (MoT, 2012). However, since the small-scale enterprise group was not ready 
by the deadline, the MoT delayed the inclusion of V-Legal documents in export requirements until 
2015 (MoT, 2013a), and postponed it again until 2016 (MoT, 2014a). The latest delay was taken to 
meet the MoT’s ambition in increasing the export value of wood products by 300% within the next 
5 years (Kompas, 2014). Aside from setting up regulations for ease of export, the MoT was also 
actively involved in SVLK negotiation with the EU and in promoting SVLK so that Indonesian 
furniture demand grew up by 15-20% in 2014 (MoT, 2014b). 
• The Ministry of Industry 
The Ministry of Industry (MoI) supports the SVLK as the way to expand overseas markets for 
wooden industrial products. However, the small-scale industry's unreadiness for certification and 
the high cost associated with it forced the MoI to ask the MoF and MoT for a delay in SVLK 
implementation of one year and for simplification of the SVLK verifier, mainly for wooden furniture 
and handicraft products (AMKRI, 2014). Previously, in March 2013, the MoI had also 
accommodated SMEs’ scruple on SVLK and vowed to discuss a relief for them with the MoF 
(Agroindonesia, 2013). 
• Indonesian Forest Concessionaires Association (APHI) and the Indonesian Pulp and Paper 
Association (APKI) 
The Indonesian Forest Concessionaires Association (APHI) and the Indonesian Pulp and Paper 
Association (APKI), as representatives of big players in the Indonesian wood industry, actually 
support the SVLK, in order to improve their product image in the global market (Agrofarm, 2013). 
Nevertheless, since end buyers ask for FSC-certified products, local industries have to opt 
exclusively for FSC-certified timber in their production line. Consequently, SVLK-certified 
intermediary goods cannot be sold locally, let alone in the global market (The Jakarta Post, 2014b) 
and the producers have to bear a double cost to tackle the problem (Hutan Indonesia, 2013). Since 
the SVLK is designed to comply with an agreement with the EU (Pohnan and Stone, 2013), the 
policy of making the SVLK obligatory for all logging companies and wood-processing industries is 
considered detrimental to local businesses and industries not oriented towards the European 
market. Both associations have already asked the government to open more local markets for 
SVLK-certified products and to promote the SVLK more broadly. 
• Indonesian Sawmill and Woodworking Association (ISWA), Association of Indonesian Furniture 
and Crafts Producers (Asmindo) and small tree growers 
Small wood industries and small tree growers support the SVLK, associating it with better 
market access in Europe and other countries (The Jakarta Post, 2014a; Agroobserver, 2015). 
However, they warn that the requirements for small industries should be simpler than those for 
big ones, since small tree growers work in private land parcels, and they do their own planting and 
harvesting (Agroindonesia, 2014). They also may change the use of the land or sell it in a 
traditional way, without permits from anybody else. Hence, they don’t have to “formalise” their 
business by means of legal permits, taxation, environmental assessment and other administrative 
documents, which are costly (Obidzinski et al., 2014). 
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• European Union (EU) 
EU efforts to halt illegal timber circulation inside and outside the region are evident in the two 
main regulations under the FLEGT Action Plan, namely the FLEGT-VPA and the EU Timber 
Regulation (EUTR). The EUTR can be seen as an economic tool to strengthen the position of 
European timber against its competitors, since any wood products to be exported to Europe have 
to pass a due diligence investigation by operators (van Heeswijk and Turnhout, 2013). In contrast, 
the FLEGT-VPA, which includes a timber legality assurance system (TLAS) from the producer 
country, ignores the due diligence process for FLEGT-licensed products. In the case of the SVLK, 
both Indonesia and EU parties signed and ratified the VPA in 2014 and acknowledged SVLK as 
Indonesian TLAS. However, the EU support for the SVLK cannot be seen simply as a passport of 
sorts for Indonesia’s wood products entering EU territory, since it could be suspended once a 
SVLK-licensed product is discredited (Hawin et al., 2010). 
• The Multistakeholder Forestry Programme (MFP) and Kehati Foundation 
The MFP is a UK-funded program that assists the MoF in developing and promoting the SVLK, 
and in helping FMUs and small enterprises to obtain SVLK-based certificates through its coaching 
program (Raharjo, 2013). Together with the MoF, the MFP was engaged in SVLK negotiations with 
the EU. The MFP also strongly encourages the government of Indonesia to implement SVLK and 
rejects its delay, which the industry sector has requested often. The Kehati foundation, on the 
other hand, is a national funding agency that supports activities related to biodiversity 
conservation. Both the MFP and Kehati reckon that SVLK is in line and could be the way to succeed 
REDD+ program (Dharmawan et al., 2012). 
4.3.2. The coalition on private certification  
Most leading ENGOs support private certification initiatives to achieve better forest 
governance. These include: the Borneo Initiative, the Tropical Forest Foundation and the WWF-
Global Forest and Trade Network, which work on the LEI and FSC schemes, and Greenpeace and 
the Nature Conservancy, which work on the FSC (Greenpeace, 2014). These ENGOs promote 
schemes they support and decline others for reasons of lack of accountability, poor sustainability 
standards and double costs consequence, among others. A network of ten ENGOs, called the Anti 
Forest-Mafia Coalition has criticized the SVLK, judging it to be flawed and a new form of "green 
washing" illegal timber (Anti Forest-Mafia Coalition, 2014). However, their members also help 
small enterprises to obtain SVLK certificates (Antara, 2015). Some of them publish SVLK’s 
weaknesses repeatedly, even though they do not show their partiality to private forest 
certification schemes. 
4.3.3. Other actors  
• Certification Bodies 
Currently there are 18, 2 and 4 certification bodies working on the SVLK, the FSC and the LEI, 
respectively (MoF, 2013; various sources) where some of them work with more than one scheme. 
Certification bodies have the right to issue certificates of sustainable forest management practice 
or chain of custody and the right to withdraw such a certificate during an annual inspection if the 
holders no longer comply with the standards of a given certification scheme. Due to a 
disproportional ratio between the certification body and number of areas/companies to be 
certified, the certification cost is increasing and is becoming unaffordable for small industries 
(Obidzinski et al., 2014). The principle of transparency in the audit process makes it possible for 
one certification body to know what other bodies do, what auditor works for which body, and the 
certification fees applied to particular audit process. Furthermore, once a certification body has 
conducted an audit, it has to announce the plan or the results on determined website so that it is 
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open to input from independent observers, NGOs, and other stakeholders. The transparency 
principle allows the work of the auditor to be criticized (see also Maletz and Tysiatchniouk, 2009); 
hence, the certificates already issued may be withdrawn for many reasons. Frequently revocations 
of certificates will affect not only the certification body, but also the certification scheme they use. 
• International buyers 
After FLEGT-VPA signation, timber certified for sustainability and timber certified for legality 
compete for consumer demand for eco-friendly products. International buyers, as the end users of 
such products, will choose between state-based certified products and private-based certified 
woods. Accordingly, it is important to provide potential buyers with appropriate information on 
own products’ superiority (Cashore, 2002). Potts et al. (2010) point out that major retailers in 
North America have decided to choose forest products derived from sustainable sources, whereas 
EU countries require importers, manufacturers, and retailers to have chain of custody (CoC) 
certification that clarifies the origin of their timber. Cai and Aguilar (2013) compiled 19 studies on 
consumer’s willingness-to-pay for certified wood products, and found that 1- 39% of consumers 
were willing to pay premium prices for these products, no matter what kind of label it had. This 
means that the number of consumers willing to pay a higher price for certified products was less 
than that of those unwilling to pay. Consumers do not care whether products are certified or not, 
let alone whether the certification initiatives are private or governmental. 
We summarize actors’ major power under each power element type (Table 2) to make a way 
in predicting their fragmentation and future possibly alliance. The power elements are used 
rationally, depends on actor interest; and not always used or appeared in their action although 
they are able to do so. 
 
Table 2. Major power element of powerful actor 
Type of power element Powerful actor Strategic power 
Coercion Ministry of Environment and 
Forestry  
Permit for forest management unit 
and industries 
 Ministry of Trade Permit to export wooden goods 
 EU FLEGT licencing for wood products to 
enter EU 
Dis(incentive) Ministry of Environment and 
Forestry 
Providing financial support for  
legality verification  
 International buyers Creating demands for certified 
wooden goods 
Dominant information Ministry of Environment and 
Forestry 
Revising and evaluating SVLK 
standard 
 Ministry of Industry Holding information on industry 
competitiveness and healthy  
 Private certification owners Good image   
 MFP and Kehati Foundation Negotiation experts and facilitators 
 Environmental NGOs International influencers and opinion 
makers for environmental issues 
 Certification body Issuing sustainability and legality 
certificates 
 
5. Discussion 
5.1. Fragmented certification schemes and their alliances 
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Based on policy-making authority, Cashore (2002) divides environmental governance into 
three categories, namely, “non-state market driven governance”, characterized by the lack of 
government involvement in the policy-making process; “shared private/public governance”, in 
which policy-making is shared with the government; and “traditional governance”, where policy-
making authority belongs fully with the government. Gulbrandsen (2004) uses the term "private 
governance" to refer to NSMD governance, and "public governance" (meaning state governance) 
for traditional governance. Gulbrandsen (2004) adds hybrid private-public governance to denote 
industry-dominated involvement in mixed private and public governance. Following categorization 
by Cashore (2002) and Gulbrandsen (2004) we found that there are now four clusters of forest 
certification governance present in Indonesia, namely environmental-private governance, hybrid 
private-public governance, producer-private governance, and state governance, with the FSC, the 
LEI, the IFFC  and the SVLK representing each scheme, respectively (Table 3). It is important to note 
that the cluster is not within the strict boundary. Each actor may cooperate with other parties in 
other groups if it deemed to be gainful. 
 
Table 3. Cluster of forest certification governance in Indonesia 
Key features Environmental-
private 
governance (FSC) 
Hybrid private-
public 
governance (LEI) 
Producer-private 
governance 
(PEFC/IFCC) 
State 
governance 
(SVLK) 
Rule maker Environmentalists  Academics Land owners Government  
State 
involvement 
No Partially Limited  Full 
Major 
supporting actor 
ENGOs None Forest and 
wood-based 
Industry 
Government 
Coverage 
territory 
International  Mainly in 
Indonesia 
International  Mainly in 
Indonesia 
Auditor Third party Third party Third party Third party 
Public 
examination 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Certificate 
acceptability 
International National  International EU and National 
Brand image Strong Weak Quite strong Weak  
Industry 
participation 
Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Mandatory  
Influential actor 
to succeed  
Business to 
business 
Business to 
business 
Business to 
business 
Government to 
government and 
business to 
business 
Law 
enforcement 
No No No Yes  
 
 
Except for the LEI, the other three schemes have their supporting actors who promote the 
schemes’ excellence. Due to the lack of capital, human resource and interest affinity, and 
therefore we argue that the hybrid private-public government will disappear, and the FMUs and 
wood industries will make alliances with the government to support traditional forest governance. 
The IFFC could join the SVLK, since the IFFC originally devoted for forest owners and forest 
managers. Consequently, there will be only two certification schemes competing for authority in 
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the future, namely, the pro-environment and pro-business schemes. The first scheme is 
represented by the FSC and would be supported by ENGOs, academics and the pro-environmental 
community, and the LEI, since LEI already signed a joint certification protocol with the FSC. With 
this collaboration, the FSC has a local partner to introduce its more local-value adapted scheme, 
and the LEI could maintain its presence in the forest certification field. The increasing number and 
size of certified forests under FSC indicates the strengthening of this scheme cluster. Conversely, 
the pro-business scheme consists of SVLK and PEFC will mutually reinforce and possible to make 
joint recognition for effective certification process, and wider market access. This scheme is 
supported by the government, landowners, and FMUs. Due to the wider stakeholder involvement 
and its mandatory nature, this scheme seems to flourish continuously, as indicated by its progress 
in the year of early implementation. 
Through this process, the forest certification regime becomes less complex, since national 
political processes replace and reduce the international element of international forest regimes, 
and standard of these schemes may less different (McDermott et al., 2008). Industrial groups, as 
the users of the certification scheme, have to engage with the SVLK to maintain their business 
continuity and to enter the market, and only add the FSC to improve their reputation (Wibowo et 
al., 2015). However, the solidity of this pattern will become more stable under the following 
conditions. First, if the government of Indonesia promotes the SVLK and its acceptance in other 
consumer countries, hence industries will need no other certification scheme when exporting their 
products to such countries. Second, if the government preserves the SVLK as a reputable 
certification scheme by publishing data having to do with the ways in which the SVLK contributes 
to the deforestation rate reduction and to the enhancements of society and ecology. Third, if 
there are fewer or no objections from other stakeholders about the performance of industries that 
are SVLK-certified, indicating that these companies do business in legal and sustainable ways. 
5.2. Obligation and fees as bureaucratic power strategy under SVLK  
By making the SVLK mandatory for all FMUs and timber manufacturers, the MoF may gain at 
least three benefits. First, it could increase its presence in downstream industry circles by financing 
the first SVLK-certification process for small enterprises (Neraca, 2014). Through this assistance, 
the MoF would gain power over small enterprises, which in the past have belonged in the domain 
of the MoI. Second, compelling the enterprises to choose SVLK only or either SVLK and private 
schemes. The high cost of legality verification and forest certification is the main factor obstructing 
companies to engage with those processes (Tacconi, 2007; Obidzinski et al., 2014), although it 
does not always correspond to its benefits. Pratiwi (2015) shows that only around 24% of industry, 
forest companies and their related associations state that the cost of SVLK-certification is worth its 
benefits, while only 26% of them acknowledge that they always receive premium prices from their 
certified products. The gap between the cost and the benefits resulting from certification process 
forces business actors to be realistic in choosing appropriate certification scheme. This selection 
strongly depends on their market target and value of the exported products (see Fikru, 2014). If 
combination of mandatory and voluntary certification costs were higher than the profit, business 
tended to choose only the SVLK for their products. Third, as consequence of the previous point, 
the SVLK may be better known and legitimate in domestic and overseas markets. With only around 
10% share of Indonesian timber export value goes to Europe (MoF, 2014c), the obligation to put V-
legal sign (sign for SVLK-certified products) in all exported timber products will make SVLK better 
known in other major destination countries like China, Japan, and South Korea. 
5.3. Privileging large-scale industries over smallholders 
It is widely known that small scale wood industries and tree growers are characterized by 
limited administration records, production-by-demand orientation, simple management practices, 
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and have less capacity to follow market dynamics (Nurrochmat, 2004). Obidzinski et al. (2014) 
point out the major challenges to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in obtaining SVLK-based 
certificates, namely: business legality status; limited supply of legal timber; small profit margins 
spread over a long value chain; high certification costs; and small volume and unpredictable 
harvest times. Under these circumstances it is hard for them to obtain wood legality certificates (S-
LK; SVLK-based certificate) even if the trees grown in home yards and their transfers to processing 
industries are truly legal. The lack of verification bodies and the limited financial support by 
government are other obstacles for the engagement of small industries in SVLK schemes 
(Obidzinski et al., 2014). Hence, the policy of implementing SVLK certification in all wood industries 
is thought to be a simple way to increase export value to European markets by large industries, at 
the expense of SMEs. On the other hand, the export ban policy for non-certified industry will cut 
USD 900 million in annual income for SMEs, which amounts to 30% of the total wood export value 
to non-European markets, excluding pulp and paper (Agroindonesia, 2014). To avoid this loss, the 
MoT has postponed the implementation of such a policy twice already. 
It seems that the MoT places foreign market access and trade performance as the top 
priority, followed by the survival of large scale industries, wood legality, the subsistence of SMEs, 
and facility of sales for small tree growers. This policy might limit the circulation of illegal wood, 
facilitate the supervision of the industry and increase the trust in the SVLK; but it suppresses small 
and very locally-oriented industries, and creates a disincentive for small tree growers. Small tree 
growers face legal consequences and may even be found guilty of criminal charges when they 
harvest and transfer wood from their garden to small wood industries. A more local and adaptive 
policy that is able to distinguish illegal timber and -incomplete documented timber –like a 
conformity declaration already being considered– is needed for this kind of business (Kemitraan, 
2014), in order to avoid negative social consequences. 
6. Conclusions 
The Ministry of (Environment and) Forestry was under political pressure from other 
bureaucracies, and was asked to improve its performance in generating income from forest areas. 
The Ministry then used its authority to govern forest product circulation and trade in domestic and 
global markets through the forest certification initiative. This program has at least four goals: to 
show the public its efforts in reducing illegal logging and the deforestation rate; to restore the 
forestry sector as the main contributor to state income, as it was in 1990s; to preserve its 
existence by obliging all FMUs and wood industries to be certified by such a scheme and to 
become the agency in charge of the Indonesia-EU agreement on FLEGT; and to increase the state 
sovereignty over forests, by being the institution to decide on the legality of timber. The 
involvement of the MoF in the forest certification arrangement indicates that private governance 
is not the final and stable form of this regime, as is argued by some scholars (e.g. Hackett, 2013; 
Overdevest and Zeitlin, 2014). In addition, the MoF uses its authority to reclaim authority over 
private actors (see also Giessen et al., 2016). The MoF is likely to succeed, due to the ease of 
implementation and simple standards of the scheme, which also account for the relatively 
inexpensive cost of certification assessment fee, in comparison to its competitors (Pratiwi et al., 
2015; Maryudi, 2016). Furthermore, the mandatory nature of the SVLK means it has fixed a 
downstream market, i.e., FMUs and wood industries, whilst upstream it can profit from an 
educated market that has already been created by private governance. In this case, the state 
governance seems to be the free rider. 
A remaining question needs to answer by both governances is whether their presence is able 
to reduce forest loss and to sustain forest management. Since 18% of deforested area in Indonesia 
is open land and the rest is designated for development purposes (Kissinger et al., 2012), we argue 
that the certification regime will be unable to reduce forest conversions. Most of the forest 
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conversions were planned and allowed by the government, and that is why these, together with 
other “deforested areas”, were not included in the calculation of the deforestation rate (Bellot et 
al., 2014). In addition, the sustainability criteria of certification regimes do not reflect the fact that 
small tree growers do clear-cutting when they need cash for unforeseen expenses, like a marriage 
or educational costs, and that they do not replant their gardens. Hence, legality verification and 
sustainability certification are disconnected from forest (land) management performed by small 
tree growers or forest companies. Based on these points, we argue that the certification regime 
and legality verification are merely instruments to govern timber trade (indicated as transnational 
business governance by Lesniewska and McDermott, 2014) at the expense of small and traditional 
tree growers, rather than an effort to secure remaining tropical forests. 
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